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The past thirty years have witnessed the significant expan-
sion' and transformation2 of products liability law. Despite
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1. The origin of strict products liability can be traced to the 1963 California
Supreme Court decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897, 901
(Cal. 1963). In 1965, the American Law Institute adopted § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which embraced the holding in Greenman that a strict liability
cause of action is available in litigation involving injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The consequences of this
innovative theory were explosive. See William P. Bivins, Jr., The Products Liability
Crisis: Modest Proposals for Legislative Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 595, 598 (1978)
(describing products liability reform as a "volatile" area of law); see also John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 825
(1973) (recognizing that strict liability for injury has "swept" the area of products
liability). See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of
Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
321, 326-27 (1986) (finding statistical support for the proposition that products
liability suits outnumber other types of tort actions); Michael Hoenig, Products
Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS. L.J. 213, 220 (noting that "the
modem era of products liability has witnessed a tremendous growth of claims in-
volving a wide diversity of products and factual circumstances").
2. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 802-05 (1966) (detailing explosion in field of
products liability law and noting that strict liability is historically linked to law of
animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, worker's compensation, libel,
misrepresentation, and respondeat superior); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
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some initial confusion as to the proper interpretation and appli-
cation of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,'
the combined efforts of various jurists and legal commentators
have settled a considerable number of these issues. 4 Some prob-
lems remain, however, that require further investigation.5 Many
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 69 (1983)
(finding contemporary increase in litigation to be caused by changing social condi-
tions such as greater knowledge of injury causation and better dissemination of such
knowledge to consuming public).
3. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The innovative theory advanced by
the Greenman court and adopted by the Restatement led to some initial confusion as
the courts were not sure how to apply some of the novel provisions of § 402A. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REP., VOL. I, at 3-6 (1978) (noting wide disparity in courts' interpretation of the
legal theories of recovery available in § 402A). Much of the indecision that initially
plagued the application of § 402A has now been settled, and the section continues to
be a means of compensation for injured plaintiffs. See, e.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v.
Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966) (concluding that § 402A states appropriate
standards of responsibility for manufacturer), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
4. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849-51 (Tex. 1979) (de-
fining "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" in design defect cases); Gonzales v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1978) (recognizing that strict
liability involves determination of whether a product is defective). Now that almost
three decades have passed since the adoption of § 402A, the concept and a majority
of its elements have been clearly established and universally accepted. See, e.g., East
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865-66 (1986)
(recognizing strict products liability as part of general maritime law); McKisson v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1967) (adopting § 402A strict lia-
bility); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that strict products liability was adopted in Texas in 1967 and has been applied
since that date).
5. See generally Charles E. Cantu, A New Look at an Old Conundrum: The De-
terminative Test for the Hybrid Sales/Service Transaction Under Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 45 ARK. L. REV. 913, 914-18 (1993) (noting that
§ 402A does not apply to service transactions, but expressing special concern for
sales/service transactions and determinative test used to ascertain whether § 402A
1994] Section 402A
of these problems were not contemplated at the time of the
Section's adoption. One of these problem areas involves the
allocation of liability for injuries resulting from the destruction,
dismantling, and recycling of products whose useful lives have
come to an end.
This Article considers the current state of the law in this
area and, by necessity, presents an alternative to both the rea-
soning and outcome of cases that affect this area of the law. As
we prepare to enter the twenty-first century, America and the
world face the end of an era in which we could be described as a
"disposable society."6 Because we can no longer afford the luxu-
ry of burgeoning landfills, we must learn to reclaim and extend
the use of our natural resources.7 Current conditions necessarily
require the recycling of goods which cease to be useful in their
originally manufactured form.' Should the recycling process
result in injury to the earth, the environment,9 or to individuals
should be applied to particular transaction); Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning
of the Term 'Product" Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44
OKLA. L. REV. 635, 638 (1991) (finding that in interpreting word "product," courts
have consistently rejected dictionary definitions and instead used policy reasons
underlying strict liability as a method of definition). The use of the. underlying policy
reasons has led to unusual results. For example, services, real estate, blood, electrici-
ty, component parts, water, computer software, and ideas have been labeled as
products in one form or another. Id. at 638-59. In some cases, § 402A has been
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the American Law Institute's original
intent. Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: A Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 211 (1989-90) (noting that § 402A
has not always been interpreted as originally intended).
6. See Roger D. Wynne, Note, Defining "Green": Toward Regulation of Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 785, 785-86 (1991) (reporting
that consumers are becoming environmentally conscious shoppers who seek to pur-
chase products whose disposal will not contaminate environment). The awareness of
the impact on the environment from disposable goods has fostered a phenomenon
known as "green consumerism." Id.
7. Lack of landfill space is now considered to be a crisis situation in the
United States. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, FACING
AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NExT FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE? 271-75 (1989) (report-
ing EPA's estimate that in 20 years 80% of all American landfills will be closed).
8. See Wynne, supra note 6, at 786 (noting that manufacturers are converting
many products and their packaging, including recyclable products, to forms consid-
ered to be "environmentally friendly"); Denis Hayes, Feeling Green About "Green,"
ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 46 (finding trend by manufacturers to minimize
environmental impact by making products that are durable, reusable, repairable, and
recyclable).
9. See Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 634 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
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engaged in the recycling procedure itself,'° then the law must
hold someone accountable. Liability is most logically and appro-
priately placed on the original product manufacturer, especially
in instances where the damaging event is a foreseeable one.'
(discussing environmental damage by PCB-contaminated oil that leaked or spilled
during course of storage, handling, and dismantling of defendant's electrical com-
ponents); High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 559 So. 2d 227, 227-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (indicating plaintiffs dismantling procedure included dumping onto
ground dielectric fluid contained in defendant's transformers), approved in part and
quashed in part, 610 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1992); cf 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659 (West Supp.
1994) (impliedly granting a private cause of action for cost of cleaning up toxic
waste); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982) (noting Congressional intent to hasten cleanup of hazardous waste
disposal sites).
10. See Boscarino v. Convenience Marine Products, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 116, 117-
18 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding injury to plaintiff obtained during process of dismantling
product intended for disposal was not a reasonably foreseeable use of the defendant's
product and, therefore, summary judgment ruling was appropriate); Wingett v.
Teledyne Indus., 479 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ind. 1985) (finding injury to plaintiff during
demolition of a product not covered under § 402A because activity was not a reason-
ably foreseeable use of product); Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246,
249-50 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (recognizing that injury to plaintiff was due to recycling of
defendant's product, but that plaintiffs were neither "users" of defendant's products
under § 402A nor persons for whose use the products were supplied under § 388).
11. See White v. Amoco Oil Co., 835 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1988) (extending
strict liability and negligence to foreseeable product uses and even to foreseeable
misuses); Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing
foreseeability question to proceed to jury since manufacturer should be liable for
subsequent alterations found to be reasonably foreseeable); Scott v. Allen Bradley
Co., 362 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Mich. 1984) (holding that an intervening act will not re-
lieve a manufacturer's liability if act was reasonably foreseeable); Michael B. Gallub,
Limiting the Manufacturer's Duty for Subsequent Product Alteration: Three Steps to a
Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361, 404 n.242 (1988) (noting that com-
mentators have stated that "the foreseeability approach to substantial change is vital
in the determination of design defects that render a product unsafe in normal use"
and that "foreseeability of product's uses establishes the parameters of its
manufacturer's responsibility").
1994] Section 402A
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
At present, there are five cases which address this particu-
lar issue.12 The rule derived from each is that a manufacturer's
liability does not extend to injuries resulting from the destruc-
tion, dismantling, or recycling of products.'" The rationale be-
hind this rule is twofold: First, individuals engaged in these
types of procedures are not "users" for purposes of the Restate-
ment.14 Second, these processes do not constitute foreseeable
12. See Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 117 (considering plaintiffs' claims that "in-
tended use" of product under § 402A includes any use reasonably foreseeable to
manufacturer and that dismantling and disposal of product was reasonably foresee-
able); High, 559 So. 2d at 227 (noting that plaintiff sought recovery under strict
products liability for injuries resulting from exposure to hazardous material con-
tained in junk transformers), modified, 610 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1992); Kalik, 658 F.
Supp. at 634 (identifying plaintiffs' claim that manufacturers of electrical components
containing hazardous substance are liable under § 402A for damages resulting from
scrap recovery process); Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 55-56 (recognizing appellant's asser-
tion that dismantling or demolition of product should fall within meaning of "use"
under strict products liability doctrine); Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 248 (addressing
plaintiffs' contention that defendant battery manufacturers are responsible under
strict products liability for injuries resulting from process of smelting lead obtained
from dismantled automotive batteries).
13. See Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 117 (agreeing that dismantling a product is
not an intended use which gives rise to a strict liability claim); High, 559 So. 2d at
229 (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant upon holding
as matter of law that salvaging junk components of manufacturer's product was not
foreseeable product use, nor was plaintiff intended user); Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 635-
36 (dismissing claim for damages on basis that dismantling and processing of junk
electrical components did not comprise reasonably foreseeable use of product);
Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56 (holding that manufacturer's liability for product placed in
stream of commerce does not extend to injuries resulting from demolition of that
product); Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249-50 (granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment on ground that smelting of lead previously contained in automotive bat-
teries manufactured by defendant did not constitute "use" of product under Restate-
ment).
14. See High, 559 So. 2d at 229 (declining to classify plaintiff as "user" under
meaning of Restatement § 402A); Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249-50 (refusing to
define plaintiffs involved in smelting process as "users" of defendants' automotive
batteries). Although the High and Johnson courts narrowly defined "user" as a
person who has contact with the actual product rather than its toxic byproducts,
historically "user" has been broadly construed. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that workers who made goods out
of asbestos were "users" of asbestos and therefore fell under § 402A), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968) (holding
that individual leaning across escalator to render aid to fallen child was "user" of
product). See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Stricter Products Liability, 52 Mo. L. REV.
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product uses." Consequently, the few courts which have consid-
ered this issue have held that the provisions of Section 402A do
not apply. 6 As a result of this reasoning, manufacturers escape
responsibility for products which either contaminate the earth 7
or cause individual injury's at the reclamation stage of their
existence. In many instances, these harms are inflicted, not be-
cause the product is an inherently dangerous one, but instead
because the manufacturer has failed to issue a simple warning
to the user of the product. 9
1, 40-45 (1987) (discussing essential decisional criteria of foreseeable use, product
misuse, and foreseeable user when assessing whether product is unreasonably
dangerous and manufacturer is subject to liability).
15. See High, 559 So. 2d at 229 (holding that dismantling of electrical trans-
former to salvage contents did not comprise reasonably foreseeable use of product as
matter of law); Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 635 (concluding as matter of law that "the
dismantling and processing of junk electrical components was not a reasonably
foreseeable use of [defendant's] product"); Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56 (finding that
removal of ductwork did not constitute foreseeable use). A product's legal defective-
ness is "judged within the context of its utilization" or through "its reasonably an-
ticipated (or foreseeable) use." Terry, supra note 14, at 41. See also Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974); Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 n.4 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). The inquiry into whether
liability exists turns on the meaning of "foreseeable," which has been broadly as well
as narrowly defined. Terry, supra note 14, at 42. "At the very least, something is
foreseeable if it has occurred before or if someone of relevance predicted that it
would occur" during the manufacturer's intended use. Id. See Jackson v. Ray Kruse
Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Mo. 1986) (Higgins, C.J., concurring). When
foreseeability is broadly defined, it "does not require that prior identical or even
similar events must have occurred.' Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 129 (Cal.
1985) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
16. See High, 559 So. 2d at 229 (holding § 402A to be inapplicable to plaintiffs
claim); Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 634-36 (dismissing plaintiff's attempt to recover
damages under § 402A for injuries resulting from dismantling of junk electrical
components); Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 55-56 (affirming trial court's grant of summary
judgment to defendants on partial basis that they owed no duty to injured party
under strict products liability law); Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249-50 (refusing to
apply § 402A to plaintiffs' claims).
17. See High, 559 So. 2d at 229 (exonerating manufacturer from liability when
its product's useful life had ceased); Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 635-36 (holding that
dismantling junk electrical components was not "reasonably foreseeable" and that
defendant was not liable for damages caused by PCB-contaminated oil that spilled
onto plaintiffs land).
18. See Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 55-56 (refusing to compensate plaintiffs for
injuries which resulted from the demolition of manufacturer's product); Johnson, 562
F. Supp. at 249-50 (holding that employees contaminated by lead during recycling
process were not "users" of products under the Restatement).
19. See Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 55-56 (holding that dismantling of product was
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In the first case, Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc.,2° which
was decided over a decade ago, employees of various lead smelt-
ing companies brought suit in an attempt to recover damages for
injuries which resulted from their exposure to toxic fumes and
particulants.2' These materials were emitted during the process
of smelting lead from dismantled automotive batteries which
were originally manufactured by the defendants.22 The plain-
tiffs stipulated that the batteries did not injure them while the
batteries were intact or while the batteries were being de-
stroyedY Instead, the alleged injuries were sustained while the
lead portion of the previously dismantled batteries was being
transformed into an injurious substance.' Under these circum-
stances, the court found that the plaintiffs had not come in con-
tact with the defendants' product, which was the intact automo-
tive battery; rather, it was apparent that by the time the harm
occurred, the defendants' product had ceased to exist.' Al-
not foreseeable use and, therefore, manufacturer did not have duty to warn); John-
son, 562 F. Supp. at 249-50 (stating that manufacturer had no duty to warn of
potential danger of lead contamination involved in recycling automobile batteries be-
cause recycling was not foreseeable use of product). The Restatement does not
mention warnings or directions for use; the language of comment j is pertinent to
the issue of when the duty to warn arises. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. j (1965). Comment j states that "[in order to prevent the product from being
unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on
the container, as to its use." Id; cf. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669
(D. Or. 1963) (distinguishing between instructions which are provided to assure ef-
fective use and warnings which are provided to assure safe use). But see Mason v.
Ashland Exploration, Inc., 965 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to extend liability
for failure to warn when danger was obvious).
20. 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
21. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 248.
22. Id. The court cited several stipulations from the record concerning the
recycling of automotive batteries. Id. The court noted that batteries contain lead
which is normally an inert material that does not result in injuries in an intact
form. Id. Because lead is a fairly rare metal, the batteries are resold for recycling
after their useful life has ended. Id. The initial step in the recycling process is to
destroy the battery;, however, the destruction of the battery does not generate any
significant level of lead fumes or dust. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249. The types of
fumes and dust that are damaging to humans, and those alleged by the plaintiffs to
have caused their injuries, occur only after the extraction of the lead from the




25. Id. The court stated that "[p]laintiffs did not even come in contact with
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though the court conceded that the term "user" had been broadly
construed in the past,26 the court reasoned that some limits
must be imposed27 and consequently held as a matter of law
that the plaintiffs were neither users "nor persons for whose use
the products are supplied."' Because it refused to classify the
plaintiffs as users in this case, the court concluded that liability
under Section 402A did not apply.29
From the peculiar circumstances of this case, the court's
conclusion was correct that when the plaintiffs sustained their
alleged injuries, the product was no longer in existence, nor was
it in the process of being recycled."0 Instead, after the commodi-
ty had been totally dismantled, a part thereof had been removed
and was in the process of being transformed." The lead, which
was a part of the original battery, was being salvaged.12 It
would be untenable to hold that the plaintiffs were users in this
scenario. The cases that followed Johnson, however, are not so
logical. Their error resulted from the misapplication of the rule
of this case.
The second case, Wingett v. Teledyne Industries,' was de-
cided two years after Johnson.' The plaintiff in Wingett, an
[diefendants' product; [diefendants' product had ceased to exist" at time of plaintiffs'
injuries. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249.
26. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249 (conceding existence of prior broad construc-
tion of "user" as contained in § 402A). In support of this observation, the court cited
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding
that workers producing goods from asbestos are "users" of asbestos), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974), and Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968) (holding
that person leaning across moving escalator to save fallen child is a "user" of esca-
lator). Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249. The court noted that "even an accidental
contact with the product, after it has passed through many hands, can constitute
'use' of the product." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. 1
(1965) (providing that protection extends to all parties who will be affected by
product's ultimate use). But see Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 233
(4th Cir. 1985) (stating that manufacturer's duty to warn ultimate user is satisfied if
sophisticated employer is aware of dangers involved in use of product).
27. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 249.
28. Id. at 250 (refusing to apply products liability concept of "user" in case at
bar).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 249.
31. Id.
32. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 248.
33. 479 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. 1985).
34. Johnson was decided on April 8, 1983. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 246.
Section 402A
employee of an independent contractor, was injured while re-
moving ductwork which had been manufactured and sold by the
defendant.' The ductwork, which was to be replaced by a new
reclamation system, was approximately thirty inches in diame-
ter, made of half-inch gauge steel, and connected at the end of
each segment by an iron collar.36 It was located "twenty-five to
thirty feet above the [ground] floor, was supported by aluminum
hangers attached to the... ceiling... at six to eight-foot inter-
vals.""7 The removal procedure utilized, which the plaintiff al-
leged was the standard procedure in the trade, required the
plaintiff to crawl onto a section of the ductwork, wrap a cable
around it, and attach the cable to a crane, which would then
support the ductwork as well as the plaintiff while he cut the
hangers with a torch.' The injury took place when the section
of ductwork upon which the plaintiff was working fell to the
floor after the plaintiff cut the second of two hangers supporting
that segment.39 The collapse allegedly occurred because that
particular segment was supported by an eighth-inch sheet metal
band, screws, and two clamps instead of the standard iron col-
lar. 0 The plaintiff subsequently filed suit, alleging that in addi-
tion to defendant's negligence, this condition rendered the prod-
uct defective under strict products liability law.4'
The court found for the defendants, reasoning that since the
plaintiff was engaged in the process of dismantling the product
at the time of his injury, he was engaged in an unforeseeable
Wingett was decided on June 19, 1985. Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 51.
35, Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 53.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 53-54, 56 (describing removal method used by plaintiff and recognizing
plaintiffs argument, which was accepted by court of appeals as sufficient to raise
fact issue that procedure was trade standard).
39. Id. at 53.
40. Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 53.
41. Id. at 53-55 (describing nature of plaintiffs allegations and his claim that
because pipe was supported by one-eighth inch sheet metal band, screws, and two
clamps instead of the standard iron collar, the product was defective). See generally
McJunkin v. Kaufman & Broad Home Sys., 748 P.2d 910 (Mont. 1987) (determining
defectiveness by demonstrating that the product is unsuitable for its intended
foreseeable purpose); cf. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207 (N.Y.
1983) (noting that the standard for defectiveness is whether a product is not rea-
sonably safe as designed).
19941
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use of the product." Although the court recognized that the
issue of foreseeability of use is generally a question of fact for
the jury, it held as a matter of law that the dismantling and/or
demolition of the ductwork was not foreseeable notwithstanding
the plaintiffs allegation that he had employed the existing stan-
dard trade procedure for ductwork removal.43 The court con-
cluded that because the activity was unforeseeable, the defen-
dants owed no duty to warn the plaintiff of any risks related to
the removal process." In so finding, the court issued the follow-
ing blanket statement: "We hold that a manufacturer's potential
liability for products placed in the stream of commerce does not
extend to the demolition of the product."45
The dissent, in contrast, took note of the plaintiffs allega-
tion that "[t]here is a standard method in the trade for removing
ductwork of this type."41 "If this is so," the dissent stated, "then
42. See Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56 (vacating court of appeals' ruling and affirm-
ing trial court's grant of summary judgment on grounds that defendants had no
duty to warn plaintiff because risk was not reasonably foreseeable). But see Hale
Farms, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 580 So. 2d 684, 688 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that simply because product is being used in a manner that is not specified
on product label or in instructions does not mean that use is unforeseeable or
constitutes misuse); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg, 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1156-57
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that product misuse will not relieve a manufacturer of
liability unless the intervening acts could not have been reasonably foreseen by the
defendant).
43. Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56.
44. Id. In the useful expression of one court, the requirement that the possibil-
ity of injury be reasonably foreseeable impels the examination of "whether it was
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer that the product would be unreasonably
dangerous if distributed without a warning on the label and, if so, whether the
manufacturer supplied the warning that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have supplied." Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 472 P.2d 806, 808 (Or. 1970); see, e.g.,
Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247,
252 (Iowa 1993) (acknowledging that reasonable foreseeability triggers obligation to
warn of product danger); Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 4 F.3d 596, 597-98 (8th Cir.
1993) (indicating that recovery in Missouri is dependent upon plaintiff proving
product was used in reasonably anticipated manner); Featherall v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (Va. 1979) (finding that manufacturer has no duty
to warn when product is used in unlikely, unexpected, or unforeseeable manner); see
also M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and
Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 244 & n.81 (1987) (stating that majority of juris-
dictions hold that in strict liability a seller is under a duty to warn of only those
dangers that are reasonably foreseeable).
45. Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56.
46. Id. (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
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the designer and constructor of [the ductwork] have a legal duty
to factor the employment of that method of removal into its
design and construction."47 By force, the foreseeability of this
type of use would require the manufacturer to issue a warning,
which in turn would prevent injury to anyone engaged in the
dismantling of the product.
Every first-year law student knows that problems wherein
reasonable minds would differ are defined as questions of fact
for the jury.' If the injured employee in Wingett was in fact
following the generally accepted trade practice for ductwork
removal, it would appear that the manufacturer knew, or at
least should have known, that this involvement with the product
would eventually take place. Such knowledge on the
manufacturer's part would necessarily present a foreseeable use
issue appropriate for jury consideration. In this case, however,
the court elected to rule as a matter of law that the event was
not foreseeable, and as a result the defendants were not held
liable for their failure to warn of the danger.49 As we shall see,
the illogical reasoning of this decision, along with the rule stated
in Johnson," is responsible for the current state of the law.
The third case, Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,"' makes this
fact clear. In that case, the plaintiffs operated a scrap metal
establishment.52 During the normal course of business, various
junk electrical components containing polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) were purchased, stored, dismantled, and subsequently
47. Id. (noting that allegation of trade standard was supported by plaintiffs
evidence).
48. See, e.g., Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56 (stating that foreseeability is generally
question of fact for jury); Sheldon v. West Bend Equip. Corp., 718 F.2d 603, 608 (3d
Cir. 1983) (holding that whether plaintiffs' use of product is foreseeable is a question
of fact for jury); Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (asserting that whether particular use of product is foreseeable by manufactur-
er is generally a question of fact for jury); Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E.
99 (N.Y. 1928) (indicating that it is question of fact for jury when reasonable minds
could disagree).
49. Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56.
50. Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(stating that even accidental contact with a product can constitute "use" of the
product).
51. 658 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
52. Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 633.
1994]
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 46:1:81
processed for scrap.5" The alleged injury occurred when PCB-
contaminated oil spilled or leaked onto the site and dioxins,
produced by the burning of contaminated materials in a furnace,
polluted the surrounding area.54 The plaintiffs brought suit to
recover damages related to the costs of cleaning up the site, for
injuries to the site, and for injuries to the business.55 The com-
plaint identified General Electric as one of the defendants on the
basis that it had manufactured some of the electrical compo-
nents that contained PCBs.56
In its defense, General Electric specifically alleged that "it
manufactured new electrical components, but that [plaintiff]
dealt in junk.'""' General Electric contended that since its prod-
uct55 had been substantially altered,59 the plaintiff was not a
user ° of that product and therefore was not afforded protection
53. Id. at 634.
54. Id.
55. Id. (The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) spent $1.9
million and the plaintiffs spent $22,000 to remove the contaminated oil during clean-
up of the site.).
56. Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 634.
57. Id.
58. See Charles E. Cantu, Twenty-Five Years of Strict Product Liability Law:
The Transformation and Present Meaning of Section 402A, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327,
331-33 (1993) (discussing evolution of term "product"). See generally Scott G. Night,
Products Liability: Component Part Manufacturer's Liability For Design and Warning
Defects, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 215, 219 n.13 (1988) (noting that original concept of
strict liability was applied to situations involving sale of food, but courts have since
extended doctrine to all "products").
59. See Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 484 A.2d 1225, 1230 (N.J.
1984) (stating that a change is not "substantial" unless it relates to the safety of the
product); Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369, 372-73 (Alaska 1983)
(holding that the alteration of the product after it leaves the manufacturer removes
manufacturer's liability because no "defect" existed at the time of manufacture);
Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914, 922 n.15 (Pa. 1974) (noting
that some courts have held that alterations made after the product has left the
control of the manufacturer are beyond the "substantial change" language of the
Restatement).
60. See Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); see
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. 1 (1965) (stating that
"users" include those passively enjoying benefit of product, as well as those perform-
ing work on product); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 512 (5th
Cir. 1984) (explaining that "users" include those who perform work on product); Bell
Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (determining
whether plaintiff is "user" of product requires court to first define product at issue);
Cantu, supra note 58, at 341-42 (discussing expansion of concept of 'user" to include
third parties).
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under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."' As
the court explained, the essence of this defense was that the
plaintiffs use of the product was not reasonably foreseeable by
the defendant. 2 The court concluded that it was not foresee-
able, reasoning that in order to be held liable under strict prod-
ucts liability law, a manufacturer must fail to ensure that its
product is safe for both its intended use and for any foreseeable
uses." As previously mentioned, this issue generally poses a
question of fact for the jury.' In this case, however, the court
relied upon the established precedent, citing both Johnson'
and Wingett' for the proposition that neither recycling of a
product after it has been dismantled, nor its destruction in a
recycling process, is reasonably foreseeable to the manufactur-
er. 7 Since the plaintiff had alleged that the injuries occurred
during the course of storing, handling, dismantling, and pro-
61. Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 634 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 634-35. The court noted that under § 402A a product is defective if it
contains a condition or lacks an element which makes it unsafe for its intended use.
Id. at 634. The court also noted that "intended use" is defined as any use of the
product which is reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer. Id. at 635; see White v.
Amoco Oil Co., 835 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1988) (extending strict liability and
negligence to foreseeable product uses and even to misuse); Scott v. Allen Bradley
Co., 362 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that intervening act will
not relieve a manufacturer's liability if the act was reasonably foreseeable); Gallub,
supra note 11, at 404 n.242 (noting that commentators have stated that foreseeabili-
ty approach to substantial change is vital to determination of design defects that
render product unsafe in normal use, and that foreseeability of product's uses estab-
lishes the parameters of manufacturer's responsibility).
64. Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 635 (stating that whether plaintiffs use of product
was reasonably foreseeable to manufacturer generally raises question of fact for jury
deliberation); see also Sheldon v. West Bend Equip. Corp., 718 F.2d 603, 608 (3d
Cir. 1983) (asserting that foreseeability of use to manufacturer raises question of
fact); Fane v. Zimmer Inc., 927 F.2d 124, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining that
adequacy of or need for warning is question of fact for the jury); Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (indicating that it is question of fact for jury
when reasonable minds could disagree).
65. Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
66. Wingett v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 479 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. 1985).
67. Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 635. The court, following Johnson, held "as a matter
of law, that the recycling of a product, after it has been destroyed, is not a use of
the product reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer." Id. (citing Johnson). Addi-
tionally, the court emulated the holding in Wingett by declaring that "as a matter of
law . . . the destruction of a product is not a use of the product reasonably foresee-
able to the manufacturer." Id. (citing Wingett).
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cessing the junk electrical components, the court concluded, as a
matter of law, that the procedure did not constitute a foresee-
able or intended use as far as General Electric was concerned.'
Consequently, the court held that General Electric owed no duty
to warn and could not be held liable for its failure to do so.69
Applying the same reasoning to similar facts, the court in
High v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.v° reached an identical con-
clusion."' The plaintiff in High, the employee of a scrap metal
salvage business, was injured by exposure to PCBs while in-
volved in the handling, dismantling, and processing of junked
electrical transformers.72 Although defendant Westinghouse
notified plaintiffs employer that some transformers might con-
tain PCBs,73 that a number of states had enacted legislation
providing for special reporting and labeling of PCBs,74 and that
the transformers should be checked for the presence of PCBs
during repair, maintenance, or disposal,75 the court still held
68. Id. at 635. The court found persuasive the Johnson and Wingett holdings
and cited them as authority for dismissing the claim against defendant for injury
resulting from the dismantling and processing of the electrical components. Id. at
635-36.
69. Kalik, 658 F. Supp. at 635. The duty to warn is tied to users and their
reasonably foreseeable uses of the manufactured product. Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw,
Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1980). The Hopkins court stated:
When a manufacturer can reasonably foresee that the warning it gives to a
purchaser of its product will not be adequately conveyed to probable users of
the product, then its duty to warn may extend beyond the purchaser to those
persons foreseeably endangered by the product's use.
Id. See generally Madden, supra note 44, at 285 (discussing duty to warn tied to
reasonably foreseeable use and user). Under the Restatement, a negligent failure to
warn imposes liability upon the manufacturer of a product when injury results from
the product's intended use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
70. 559 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), approved in part and quashed in
part, 610 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1992).
71. High, 559 So. 2d at 227-28 (citing Johnson, Kalik, and Wingett and holding
that (1) dismantling and destroying defendant's product in order to salvage junk
components were not reasonably foreseeable uses of product and (2) plaintiff was not
an intended user within meaning of § 402A).
72. Id. at 227. The Florida Supreme Court, on rehearing, noted the adverse
effects of human contact with PCBs, including but not limited to digestive disorders,
chloracne and other epidermal disorders, jaundice, impotence, throat and respiratory
irritations, and severe headaches. High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 610 So. 2d
1259, 1260 (Fla. 1992).




that "Westinghouse did not assume liability for a transformer
once its useful life was over and it had become a scrap item.
Rather Westinghouse was acting in a responsible corporate fash-
ion to inform its ultimate consumerT6... of potentially impor-
tant product information."77 The court employed this line of
reasoning to follow the precedent of the three previously dis-
cussed cases,7 8 concluding as a matter of law that salvaging
junk transformers was not a reasonably foreseeable use of the
product, and as such the injured plaintiff was not an intended
user within the meaning of Section 402A. 9
In High, as in Johnson," there was a logical and well-stat-
ed dissent. The dissent began by acknowledging that the issue
before the court was a narrow one: Whether a manufacturer's
responsibility for injuries terminates as a matter of law when
the product's useful life comes to an end.8' The dissent contin-
ued by noting that the Wingett"2 holding went beyond the is-
sues presented by its facts in that the Wingett plaintiffs unfore-
seeable use caused the accident.' Judge Ferguson argued that
the issue of foreseeable use is generally a question of fact for the
jury," and that from the evidence presented, a jury could have
concluded that the salvaging activities involving the transform-
ers were foreseeable by the defendant manufacturer.' The dis-
sent concluded that when an individual, without knowledge of
any danger, sustains an injury while engaged in a foreseeable
use (like the recycling or dismantling of a product) there is no
need for a rule which insulates a manufacturer from liability
76. Id. (emphasis added) (indicating that ultimate consumer who received noti-
fication was Florida Power & Light and not plaintiff because plaintiff was not an
intended user).
77. Id.
78. High, 539 So. 2d at 228 (citing Kalik, Wingett, and Johnson as authority for
holding that High was not an intended user and activities of dismantling and
salvaging were not intended uses).
79. Id. at 228-29. But see Weir v. Federal Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1391-92
(10th Cir. 1987) (stating that whether plaintiffs use of the product is foreseeable or
unforeseeable is question of fact for jury).
80. Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex.. 1983).
81. High, 559 So. 2d at 229 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
82. Wingett v. Teledyne Indus., 479 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. 1985).
83. High, 559 So. 2d at 230 n.6 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).




merely because the product's useful life has come to an end.'
Despite the rationale of the High dissent, courts continue to
apply the current rule." In Boscarino v. Convenience Marine
Products," the plaintiff was injured while attempting to dis-
mantle and dispose of a charged fire extinguisher.89 Believing
that the product might be hazardous in its existing condition,
the plaintiff and a co-worker elected to manually disarm the
extinguisher before throwing it away." After mounting it to a
wall, they removed two springs from the sprinkler head with a
pair of needle-nosed pliers and a few minutes later placed the
apparatus in a trash container. 1 Almost immediately there-
after, the extinguisher flew out of the container, striking the
plaintiff on the head.2 The extinguisher then bounced off two
walls, flew out a doorway, and landed underneath a truck.'
In the subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiffs attempted to distin-
guish their cause of action on the basis that, unlike the earlier
cases, their injuries did not result from the reprocessing of the
product for financial gain, but rather from an attempt to dispose
of the product in a safe manner.94 The plaintiffs contended that
this distinguishable purpose was, or at least should have been,
foreseeable to the manufacturer. 5 The court, however, was not
convinced by plaintiffs' argument." Citing all four cases dis-
cussed above,97 the court concluded that "the opinions them-
selves do not suggest that these decisions would be affected by a
lack of prospective commercial gain. They clearly find that the
dismantling of a product is not an intended use which gives rise
to a strict liability claim."98 Thus, relying on the established
precedent, the court granted the defendant's motion for summa-
86. Id.
87. See Boscarino v. Convenience Marine Products, 817 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Fla.
1993).
88. 817 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Fla. 1993).





94. Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 117-18.
95. Id. at 118.
96. Id.
97. Id. (referring to Kalik, Johnson, Wingett, and High).
98. Id. at 118.
[Vol. 46:1:81
1994] Section 402A
ry judgment regarding the plaintiffs' strict liability claim."
III. NECESSITY FOR A CHANGE
As the previous discussion illustrates, the current rule
emerged from three erroneous lines of reasoning: (1) the contin-
ued misapplication of the decision reached in Johnson v. Murph
Metals, Inc.; °4 (2) the illogical conclusion that individuals en-
gaged in recycling, dismantling, or demolition procedures are not
product users under section 402A;'0 ' and (3) the deduction that
these processes do not constitute uses which are uses foreseeable
by the original product manufacturer. 2
The Johnson court was correct in its conclusion. In that
case, the product had been dismantled, and a portion of the
original commodity was in the process of being salvaged when
the damaging event took place. 0 3 Thus, because the product
had been inexorably altered, it had ceased to exist at the time of
the injury.' In the cases that followed Johnson, however, the
sequence of events was different. Each of these cases involved a
product that caused injury while the product was in the process
of being dismantled or demolished. In all of these decisions, the
courts overlooked or simply refused to recognize this crucial
99. Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 118.
100. 562 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (recognizing that injuries to
plaintiffs were due to recycling of defendant's product, but that plaintiffs were
neither "users" of defendant's product nor persons for whose use the product was
supplied). See also Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 118.
101. See Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 117-18.
102. High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 559 So. 2d 227, 230 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (concluding that reasonable jury could have
found that salvaging activities were foreseeable by defendant manufacturer); Wingett
v. Teledyne Indus., 479 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ind. 1985) (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that foreseeability should be question of fact for jury). See generally Cantu,
supra note 58, at 351-52 (predicting that dismantling, disposal, and reuse will
eventually be deemed foreseeable use under § 402A).
103. Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 248.
104. Id. at 249 (recognizing that plaintiffs were in process of recycling defendant's
lead batteries which required destruction of batteries). Some courts have held that
where it is undisputed that a product defect has been created by subsequent alter-
ation, and not by the actions of the manufacturer, the manufacturer is properly
exonerated of liability as a matter of law. E.g., Foecker v. Allis-Chalmers, 366 F.
Supp. 1352, 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187, 191
(Okla. 1992); Glassey v. Continental Ins. Co., 500 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Wis. 1993).
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distinction.
In addition, each court incorrectly held, as a matter of law,
that because the dismantling and/or demolition of products is
not foreseeable, all individuals engaged in such processes are
not "users" under the Restatement.1"5 This reasoning is errone-
ous because every product, regardless of the technology involved,
has a useful life span."° After a certain period of time, every
product eventually grows old and dies. A manufacturer has
never had a duty "to furnish ... [goods] that will not wear
out."1 °7 This fact is well-recognized by courts, and as a result,
some jurisdictions have adopted the so-called "useful life de-
fense."18 This defense recognizes that a manufacturer will not
105. See Boscarino, 817 F. Supp. at 117-18 (upholding ruling of lower court as a
matter of law); High, 559 So. 2d at 229 (ruling as a matter of law that plaintiffs
process of recycling did not fall within reasonably foreseeable use definition nor did
plaintiff fall within definition of intended user); Kalik v. Allis-Chambers Corp., 658
F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (finding as a matter of law that the dismantling
of a product is not a reasonably foreseeable use); Wingett, 479 N.E.2d at 56 (holding
as a matter of law that plaintiffs use of ductwork was not reasonably foreseeable).
106. See High, 559 So. 2d at 228 (acknowledging that when transformers become
too old to be of further use, defendant sells them to scrap businesses for recycling);
Johnson, 562 F. Supp. at 248 (recognizing that because they have limited life span,
batteries are often resold for recycling purposes). Many companies are incorporating
innovative ways to facilitate the recyclability of their products into the manufactur-
ing process. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA 530-SW-89-066, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECY-
CLABILITY IN THE MARKETPLACE: A STUDY OF CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO
PROMOTION OF SOURCE REDUCED, RECYCLED, AND RECYCLABLE PRODUCTS AND PACK-
AGING 32 (1989).
107. Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 533 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1976) (citing
McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 A.2d 587, 589 (N.H. 1971)), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 871 (1976) (noting that duty of manufacturer is limited to foreseeing
results of normal use); Barich v. Ottenstror, 550 P.2d 395, 398 (Mont. 1976) (stating
that neither manufacturer nor seller is required "to produce or sell a product that
will never wear out"); Savage v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 396 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Foster v. Marshall, 341 So. 2d 1354, 1361 (La. Ct. App.
1977), for the proposition that manufacturers are not expected to produce parts that
never wear out). See generally Peter V. Letsou, A Time Dependent Model of Products
Liability, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 213 n.14 (1986) (citing cases which recognize the
absence of a duty to create goods that will not wear out); Robert A. Van Kirk, The
Evolution of Useful Life Statutes in the Products Liability Reform Effort, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 1689 (1989) (relating absence of duty to produce goods that will not wear out to
history of "useful life" defense).
108. See Miller v. G & W Elec. Co., 734 F. Supp. 450, 452 (Kan. 1990) (defining
"useful safe life" defense and exceptions to the defense); Hendricks v. Comerio
Ercole, 763 F. Supp. 505, 507-09 (Kan. 1991) (discussing evidence sufficient to rebut
useful life presumption); see, e.g., Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 275
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be held liable for injuries caused by a product which should no
longer be in use and in fact should have been discarded. 1°9 In
addition, various state legislatures have confronted the issue by
enacting statutes of repose."0 Unlike statutes of limitation,
statutes of repose bar any products liability cause of action be-
yond a set number of years after the ,product has been intro-
duced into the marketplace."' In some cases, these statutes
N.W.2d 915, 924 (Wis. 1979) (recommending, after allowing for recovery, that legisla-
ture adopt statute of repose to address burgeoning problem of open-ended liability);
Terry M. Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 602,
604 nn.10 & 12 (1983) (stating that two-thirds of states have adopted some measure
of products liability reform and listing 21 states adopting statutes of repose).
109. See Miller, 734 F. Supp. at 452.
110. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1983). The Kansas "Useful Safe Life"
statute states in part:
Useful safe life ten-year period of repose, evidence. (a) (1) Except as provided
in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section, a product seller shall not be
subject to liability in a product liability claim if the product seller proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the harm was caused after the product's
"useful safe life" had expired. "Useful safe life" begins at the time of delivery
of the product and extends for the time during which the product would nor-
mally be likely to perform or be stored in a safe manner.
Id.; see ALA. CODE § 6-2-30 (1993) (recognizing prohibition of products liability suit
for injury when cause of action is brought after certain period of time). Since the
date of injury is controlling under a statute of repose, several jurisdictions legisla-
tively established the date of accrual for asbestos-related injuries in their statutes of
repose. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-30 (1993); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.2 (West 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(e) (West Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-311
(1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5.5 (West Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-
49(2) (Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(5) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-
02(4) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.10 (Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.907 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
249(4) (1992). The date of accrual under statutes of repose is when the injured per-
son discovered, or should have discovered, the, injury in the exercise of reasonable
diligence. E.g., COL. REV. STAT. § 13-80-108(8) (West 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507-D:2 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
15-2-12.2 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
512(4) (Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(3) (West 1992). The date of
accrual in most states is not legislatively defined and must be determined by the
courts. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. 1989) (apply-
ing "discovery rule" approach in determining accrual date for asbestos-related inju-
ries); Chase v. Cassiar Mining Corp., 622 F. Supp. 1027, 1028 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (im-
plementing "last breath rule" in determining accrual date for asbestos-related inju-
ries).
111. School Bd. v. United States Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 327-28 (Va. 1987)
(explaining that "statutes of repose" and "statutes of limitations" are two distinct
types of statutes which conflict in concept, definition, and function). Statutes of
repose are distinguishable from statutes of limitations in that the latter merely cuts
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may bar a cause of action even before an injury is sustained.
Both the "useful life" and repose doctrines are unquestionably
defensive in nature.
As a matter of logic, however, courts must recognize the
converse of these doctrines. If every product has a finite useful
life and eventually reaches a point when it should no longer be
used, then at the end of that period of time the commodity must
necessarily be recycled, dismantled, or demolished. In other
words, these processes are clearly foreseeable. Although products
are not introduced into the marketplace for this purpose, and it
may therefore be argued that such procedures do not constitute
intended product uses, it is nonetheless foreseeable that all
goods placed into the stream of commerce will eventually be
recycled, dismantled, or demolished when their useful lives have
ended.
An analogy on this point may be made to one of the major
debates in products liability law that occurred in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. During this time period, there was growing
concern as to whether an automotive manufacturer had any
responsibility to protect the occupants of a vehicle from the so-
called "second collision.""2 The decision in Evans v. General
off the right to maintain a cause of action after accrual of the action. Id. Products
liability statutes of repose generally limit the liability of manufacturers by circum-
scribing the time in which a cause of action may be sustained. See Mark W. Pea-
cock, An Equitable Approach to Products Liability Statutes of Repose, 14 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 223, 225 (1993). The statute of repose extinguishes a cause of action after a
certain time period which is measured from the delivery of the product. Id. The
statute operates regardless of when the cause of action accrues. A cause of action
.accrues" when all the elements of the cause of action are in place so that the
injured party can maintain a suit thereon. Id. Conceptually, statutes of repose reflect
the legislative decision that "as a matter of policy there should be a specific time
beyond which a defendant should no longer be subjected to protracted liability. Thus
a 'statute of repose' is intended as a substantive definition of rights as distinguished
from a procedural limitation on the remedy used to enforce rights." Robert I.
Stevenson, Products Liability and the Virginia Statute of Limitations-A Call for the
Legislative Rescue Squad, 16 U. RIcH. L. REV. 323, 334 n.38 (1982).
112. The first impact occurs when the vehicle comes into contact with an object;
the second occurs when the driver and any passengers collide with the interior of
the vehicle. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968); see,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (holding automobile
manufacturer liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff when driver rapidly applied
brakes causing plaintiffs head to hit dashboard and come in contact with jagged
edge of ashtray); see also, e.g., Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 838 n.7
(3d Cir.) (defining "crashworthiness" theory), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981);
100 [Vol. 46:1:81
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Motors Corp."' originated the controversy. In Evans, the court
held that the defendant manufacturer had breached no duty in
failing to design a safer vehicle, reasoning that automobiles are
not designed, manufactured, and placed into the stream of com-
merce for the intended use of participating in collisions." As a
result of this case, automobile manufacturers had no duty to
protect the occupants of a vehicle from such an event."5
A contrary position emerged a short time later in Larsen v.
General Motors Corp.,"6 in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that automotive manufactur-
ers have a duty to provide users with a reasonably safe means of
transportation."7 In Larsen, the plaintiff was severely injured
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976) (acknowledging "second colli-
sion" theory of liability); Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(discussing "second collision" doctrine), affd, Ford Motor Co. v. Cooper, 688 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983). See generally W. James Foland,
Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in 'Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases,
16 WASHBuRN L.J. 600 (1977); Paul A. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the
Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 542-43 (1974) (discussing
crashworthiness and second collisions).
113. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), rev'd, Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
114. Evans, 359 F.2d at 824. See Martin v. Volkswagen of America, 707 F.2d
823, 824 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960, 960 (4th Cir.
1981); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), affd,
472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973). See generally J.M. Balkin,
The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 259 (1990) (citing Evans as
example for argument that defendant is not liable for plaintiffs injuries even if it is
foreseeable that some automobile collisions will occur); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative
Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 427,
.429-30 (1989) (acknowledging common law view that automobile manufacturers were
not required to predict that their products would be involved in accidents).
115. See Evans, 359 F.2d at 825 (asserting that "the intended purpose of an
automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite
the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur").
The court added that "the defendant also knows that its automobiles may be driven
into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip
them with pontoons." Id. See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., New Seat Belt Defense
Issues: The Impact of Air Bags and Mandatory Seat Belt Use Statutes on the Seat
Belt Defense, and the Basis of Damage Reduction Under the Seat Belt Defense, 73
MINN. L. REv. 1369, 1397 (1989) (acknowledging that some courts have refused to
attach liability in crashworthiness cases on the basis that accidents are not within
purpose of vehicle).
116. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
117. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503. Cf. Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F.
Supp. 73, 80 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (reflecting courts' uniform recognition of potential
liability for enhanced injury caused by the "second collision"); Caiazzo v.
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following a head-on collision.118 At trial, the plaintiff intro-
duced evidence tending to prove that most vehicles are involved
in at least one damaging event during their useful lives and that
these events sometimes cause the deaths of drivers or passen-
gers.119 The court accepted the plaintiffs argument, relying ex-
tensively on statistical data to reach its conclusion that auto-
mobile accidents are clearly foreseeable. 12' Based upon this
reasoning, the court imposed a definite duty upon automobile
manufacturers to produce crashworthy products. 2'
Evans was followed for a time, but shortly thereafter Larsen
became the majority rule in the country. Today, there is no
question concerning the duty of automobile manufacturers to
design, build, and market crashworthy vehicles. 22 This same
reasoning could be employed concerning the recycling and dis-
mantling of goods. If all products have a useful life span, it is
likely that some sort of salvaging process will take place. As a
result, it is foreseeable that individuals will engage in such
procedures. Courts should identify salvaging processes as even-
tual "uses" of products, and manufacturers could be liable for
any injuries resulting from these methods.
Furthermore, manufacturer liability in this context may be
justified under the very rationale originally advanced in favor of
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that upon
plaintiff's proof of enhanced injury attributed to a defective design, manufacturer is
liable for second collision injuries).
118. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 496-97.
119. Id. at 504-05.
120. Id. at 504-05 & n.8. The court notes that "[between one-fourth and two-
thirds of all vehicles manufactured are at sometime during their subsequent use
involved in the tragedy of human injury and death." Id. at 505 n.8. In 1965, 49,000
deaths and almost two million disabling injuries were attributed to motor vehicle
accidents. Id. at 502 n.4 (citing NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40
(1966)).
121. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 504. Liability for foreseeable misuse is now widely
accepted. E.g., Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28 (Or. 1973) (accepting
liability for foreseeable misuse); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584
S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). See generally Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground
Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict
Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 523-24 (1982) (noting that
former concept of intended purpose doctrine, used to immunize defendants from
liability because defendant lacked duty to plaintiff, has vanished).
122. See James D. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of
Proof of Injuries Resulting From "Second Collision," 9 A.L.R. 4th 494, 497 (1981).
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the adoption of strict products liability law. First, manufacturers
are in the best position to select and utilize the safest materials
in the design, manufacture, and marketing of goods.' This
reasoning may be extended to include dismantling and demoli-
tion among the factors that manufacturers must consider when
introducing a product into the stream of commerce. Second,
manufacturers are well-positioned to absorb the cost of liability
for injuries sustained during the "use" of their products."2 This
argument may be expanded to include salvaging procedures.
Third, manufacturers may protect themselves from costly lia-
bility through the procurement of insurance. Again, this princi-
ple may be applied to encompass reclamation processes. Fourth,
if the damaging event may be prevented by the issuance of a
warning, the manufacturer of the injury-causing product is the
logical entity in the chain of distribution upon whom this burden
should be placed."2
123. E.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 317 F.2d 19, 36 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d
828, 829 (Tex. 1942). See generally Keith O'Connell, Products Liability:
Manufacturer's Liability for Products Not Unreasonably Dangerous When Originally
Marketed-A Commentary on Bell Helicopter v. Bradshaw, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 494,
500-01 (1980) (stating that imposition of strict products liability is justified because
manufacturers occupy the best position to discover and correct unreasonably danger-
ous defects in products and because manufacturers' incentive to produce safe prod-
ucts is increased).
124. The dominant precept underlying the law of strict liability is that enter-
prises engaging in commercial activity are in a superior position to shoulder the
costs of, and therefore must assume strict liability for, the dangerous products they
create:
The courts [in strict liability cases] have tended to lay stress upon the fact
that the defendant is acting for his own purposes, and is seeking a benefit or
a profit from such activities, and that he is in a better position to administer
the unusual risk by passing it on to the public than is the innocent victim.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 537
(5th ed. 1984).
125. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976)
(stating that the following considerations must be balanced: the dangerous nature of
the product, the form in which it is to be used, the intensity and form of the
warnings given, the burden of requiring additional warnings, and the likelihood that
the additional warnings will be adequately communicated to those who will
foreseeably use the product); Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619 (8th
Cir. 1980) (holding that manufacturer's duty to warn extends to all persons who are
foreseeably endangered by the product); Madden, supra note 44, at 285 (discussing
duty to warn tied to reasonably foreseeable use and user); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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Finally, the argument can be made that America is awaken-
ing environmentally.126 We now seek ways not only to improve
our surroundings, but to minimize our impact on "Mother Earth"
and to make amends for our past sins.'27 Terms such as "envi-
ronmentally friendly," "recyclable," and "biodegradable" are
currently household words as shoppers and buyers consciously
attempt to protect the air and soil." Consumers want the pro-
duction of both goods and packaging to expend fewer natural
resources and to use less energy. In addition, burgeoning land-
fills have forced us to become more and more adept at the art of
recycling our goods once they fulfill their intended uses."2
These developments have given rise to the phenomenon of
"green consumerism," which has virtually replaced our "dispos-
able society."3 ° Many manufacturers have taken note of this
trend and have employed the strategy of "green marketing" of
their products.'' This process promotes the idea of recycling
OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (stating that failure to warn imposes liability upon the
manufacturer of a product when injury results from the product's intended use).
126. See DemoMemo, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1988, at 58 (finding 39% of those
surveyed in 1988 to be self-proclaimed environmentalists); Schwartz, Earth Day
Today, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1990, at 40-41 (citing 1989 Gallup report that found
79% of those aged 30-49 surveyed described themselves as environmentalists).
127. E.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA CONTRACT No. 68-D9-0169,
ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET 1-4 (1991); U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, supra note 106, at 39-40; Wynne, supra note 6, at 785-86.
128. According to some marketing experts, "green marketing" has attained the
status of a revolution. Wynne, supra note 6, at 786-87 (citing Special Issue: The
Green Marketing Revolution, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991).
129. Lack of landfill space is considered to be a crisis situation in the United
States. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 271 (reporting
EPA estimates that in 20 years 80% of all landfills will be full). Many corporations
are now attempting to lessen their effect on the landfill problem. See Zach Schiller,
P&G Tries Hauling Itself out of America's Trash Heap, Bus. WEEK., Apr. 23, 1990,
at 101 (describing efforts of Proctor and Gamble to minimize excess packaging by
redesigning containers and concentrating their products).
130. See Wynne, supra note 6, at 785-86 (reporting that consumers are becoming
environmentally conscious shoppers who seek to purchase products whose disposal
will not contaminate environment). The awareness of the impact on the environment
from disposable goods has fostered this phenomenon known as "green consumerism."
Id.
131. Many companies have made considerable attempts to minimize their
products' environmental impact. See P. CARSON & J. MOULDEN, GREEN IS GOLD:
BUSINESS TALKING TO BUSINESS ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION (1991)
(planning business strategies around increasing "green" products and images); see
also Christy Fisher, Tending Wal-Mart's Green Policy, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29,
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goods, while at the same time asserting or implying that any
reclamation procedures involving the manufacturer's goods will
inflict no harm upon the environment."2 As a result, consum-
ers of "green" products may continue their previous rate of con-
sumption while maintaining their environmental peace of mind.
This scenario expressly qualifies the recycling, dismantling,
and destruction of goods as a foreseeable use. Once we have
accepted this fact, manufacturers must be required to act accord-
ingly by providing proper and adequate instructions pertaining
to the reclamation process and by accepting responsibility for
the choice of materials that go into the design, manufacturing,
and marketing of their goods. As the above discussion illus-
trates, recycling is logically included among the uses that manu-
facturers and courts should recognize as foreseeable.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the remaining problem areas in strict products liabil-
ity law concerns the allocation of liability for injuries that occur
during the destruction, dismantling, and recycling of goods once
a product's useful life has come to an end. In this situation, the
law has evolved to provide a rule that imposes no liability upon
the manufacturer. The courts have reasoned that individuals en-
gaged in reclamation procedures are not users as required by
the Restatement and additionally that such processes are not
foreseeable product uses.
This Article has attempted to justify an alternate position to
that of the existing law by explaining the court's misapplication
1991, at 20 (illustrating trend of retailers to provide products to environmentally
conscious consumers).
132. See Wynne, supra note 6, at 785-86 (noting purchasing trend of consumers
who make decisions based upon product's ability to be recycled, its biodegradability,
or its environmental friendliness); cf. Bob Garfield, Beware: Green Overkill, ADVER-
TISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 26 (stressing that many assertions of environmental
friendly practices and products are merely gimmicks to exploit consumer's desire to
lessen harm to environment); John Holusha, Coming Clean on Goods: Ecology Claims
Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at D1 (asserting that most companies are
changing their packaging practices not because of environmental findings, but be-




of the rule in Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc.,1" by pointing out
the illogical reasoning of later cases, and by setting forth other
policy considerations. The underlying rationale of this position is
based upon a recognition of the fact that all products have a use-
ful life and eventually reach a point where they should no longer
be used, an analogy to the great debate of the 1960s and 1970s
involving the crashworthiness of automobiles, the policy behind
the original adoption of strict products liability law, and finally
the fact that America is becoming more environmentally aware.
The only logical conclusions are that reclamation procedures are
foreseeable and that manufacturers are in the best position to
assume liability for injuries caused by these procedures. Manu-
facturers are best equipped to provide adequate warnings relat-
ing to potential risks in the reclamation process or to make safer
choices as to the materials that go into the design, manufacture,
and marketing of goods placed into the stream of commerce.
133. 562 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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